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Virginia statute and its effect as applied to a factual situation similar
to that of the Stone case was considered in 60 W. VA. L. REV. 387
(1958). The conclusion was reached that the West Virginia court
would hold that the car owner could not be held liable because
the intervening act of the thief would constitute the sole proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury. Although the precise question has
never come before the West Virginia court, a recent federal district
court decision applying West Virginia law, West Virginia ex rel.
Poulos v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 263 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.W. Va.
1967), would seem to support that conclusion. The defendant car
owner in that case did not leave his keys in the ignition, but rather
negligently failed to turn the ignition to the lock position. In holding
the car owner not liable for injuries caused by the negligent driving
of a thief, the court deemed it "significant" that the car owner did
not leave his keys in the car to attract the attention of a passerby.
Logically, however, the result would seem to have been the same
even if the keys had been left dangling from the ignition.
Torts-Damages--Mother's Recovery for Emotional Trauma
and Physical Injury When Not Within the Zone of Impact
While negligently operating his motor vehicle, Legg collided with
Dillon's infant child. The collision resulted in the child's death.
Dillon witnessed the accident, but did not fear for her own physical
safety. She alleged that because of Legg's negligence she sustained
emotional disturbance, and shock and injury to her nervous system
which caused physical and mental pain and suffering. The superior
court granted a summary judgment in favor of Legg, and Dillon
appealed. Held, reversed. Emotional trauma and physical injury
caused by a mother's witnessing the death of her child as a result of
defendant motorist's negligent operation of an automobile established
a prima facie tort. Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912
(1968).
This case represents a significant advance in the field of torts
since it is the first case in the nation to allow recovery under these
circumstances. Generally, it has been held that a person who witnesses
an injury to a third person caused by a negligent tort-feasor cannot
recover for physical and mental injuries proximately caused thereby
unless he was within the zone of physical danger. See Annot., 18
A.L.R.2d 220 (1951). The instant case marks an exception to
this general rule.
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